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Abstract 
The country's ability to compete for financial and investment resources in the international arena depends on a 
number of factors that determine the favorable business environment, the level of protection of citizens' rights, 
and the material well-being of the population. One of the indicators of the quality of the economic environment 
in the country is the level of tax competitiveness, as an integrated indicator that summarizes the indicators of the 
effectiveness of the tax system and the quality of tax policy. The article summarizes the arguments and 
counterarguments within the scientific discussion on the generalization of the main theories of formation and 
development of tax competitiveness of the country. The main purpose of the article is a comparative analysis of 
theories of tax competitiveness, determining the nature of the impact of tax competitiveness on indicators of 
economic and social development of the country. The methodological tools of the study are analytical and 
comparative methods, methods of generalization and synthesis. The object of research is the theory of the 
formation of tax competitiveness of the country. Based on the results of the analysis, a conclusion about the dual 
nature of the impact of tax competition on the country's development indicators is made. Thus, tax competition 
reduces the level of taxation in countries, which negatively affects the amount of tax revenues and reduces the 
country's potential to finance socio-economic development programs, stimulates the growth of labor migration 
and relocation of tax bases in jurisdictions with more attractive tax conditions. On the other hand, tax competition 
stimulates economic growth in the leading countries by increasing their investment attractiveness, business 
activity, stimulating certain sectors of the economy. The results of the study can be useful for public authorities 
in making decisions on identifying key vectors of public tax policy in the country. 
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Introduction 
One of the main tasks of our time, which forms the preconditions for the development of international trade, 
financial globalization, international capital movements, the formation of a single financial market is the 
maximum approximation of regulations to the provisions and requirements of the international community. These 
standards are consistent with the main activities of the European community, which focuses its efforts on create 
an ever closer union. The result of these actions is the formation of a free trade zone, the introduction of a single 
currency that has free circulation in the maximum number of countries, harmonized tax, economic, educational 
standards. 
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At the same time, despite the significant efforts of the international community to solve the problem of 
inconsistency of the regulatory framework of business and the existence of significant differences in tax policies 
of individual countries ensures the formation of sustainable competitive tax advantages of some countries over 
others. Ultimately, this leads to increased capital and labor inflows, increased investment attractiveness, the 
opening of branches of international companies in some countries, and limits the government's ability to increase 
revenues in others. Thus, a more comprehensive study of the concept of tax competitiveness, the analysis of its 
main theories is forming an important instrument of increasing the financial potential of the countries. 
Literature Review 
In recent years, research on tax competition has significantly intensified. Michael Keen (2008) in «The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics» considered tax competition as a process of gaining competitive strategic 
advantage as a result of a non-cooperative game between individual jurisdictions. This is based on the 
establishment of tax rates or individual parameters of the tax system. 
Wilson and Wildasin (2004) looked at tax competition in a broad and narrow sense. In a broad sense, it is any 
form of non-cooperative setting of taxes and fees by independent governments. This approach is based on 
competition between governments of different countries for the location of tax bases in their territory. The choice 
of government policy affects the distribution of the tax base between individual jurisdictions or regions 
subordinate to those governments. This approach is based on competition for tax bases (capital, labor, income), 
companies. In a narrower sense, tax competition can be understood as any form of non-cooperative setting of 
taxes and fees by independent governments and tax policy that affects the process of distribution of tax revenues 
between the treasuries of different states. In contrast to the previous definition, this understanding of tax 
competition presupposes the existence of vertical and horizontal (taxation of the same tax base by public 
authorities of different levels (central, regional, local)) tax competition. 
Methodology and research methods. The methodological basis of the study are analytical, comparative, 
synthetic methods of analysis. 
Results 
The above-analyzed theories of tax competition allow us to conclude that there is both positive and negative 
impact of tax competition on the development of the country. At the same time, the negative effects of tax 
competitiveness are poorly understood and their magnitude cannot be accurately measured. One of the reasons 
for this situation is that tax competition can serve as a significant threat to the country's economic security, which 
requires government intervention and regulation, cooperation between governments of several countries, the 
implementation of joint measures, and insignificantly affect economic development. Wildasin (1989) was one of 
the first to study the negative impact of tax competition on the country's development. Based on empirical 
calculations, the author tried to quantify the inefficiency of tax competition. The author argued that the shortfall 
in public goods could be remedied by providing higher-level subsidies to each jurisdiction. On the example of the 
United States of America, the author estimated the amount of these subsidies (almost 40%). 
At the same time, according to Parry (2003), the loss of welfare due to tax competition does not exceed 3% of tax 
revenues or 0.15% -0.45% of GDP. 
Sorensen (2001) on the example of EU countries proved the lack of direct impact of tax competition on the volume 
of public services and the significant dependence of public spending on it. 
According to the study, the author stressed the need to harmonize tax policy between countries. Based on the 
scenario modeling, he analyzed the tools of government cooperation (setting a minimum tax rate of return on 
capital tax, harmonization of tax legislation) and proved the existence of a slight positive impact of these measures 
on economic development (0.15-0.35% of GDP). 
Patterson & Martínez-Serrano (2003) highlight the dual nature of tax competition. On the one hand, tax 
competition reduces the level of tax burden on the territory of competing countries, thus acting as a significant 
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competitive advantage of one country over others. As a rule, business is more actively developing in the countries 
with a lower level of tax burden, and a favorable tax policy serves as a driver of capital and labor flows to the 
territory of the country. At the same time, the results of the analysis show that the existence of the phenomenon 
of tax competition has not led to a reduction in the tax base in either the EU or the OECD. Thus, despite the fact 
that trends in the tax burden on the country's GDP show a trend towards their steady growth, comparisons of 
average total tax burden over the past ten years with similar figures 20 years ago show a decrease in tax growth 
in the world. Based on this analysis, the authors conclude that tax competition has actually reduced the trend of 
increasing tax burden in countries with high levels and led to the convergence of tax policies within the EU. 
On the other hand, tax competition leads to a decrease in tax revenues to the budget, thereby threatening the 
economic security of the country. Quite often in the process of competition for additional tax bases, countries 
significantly reduce the level of tax burden to an economically unreasonable level. 
One of the first issues of tax competition was studied by Wallace Oates (1972). In his work, the author 
substantiated the negative impact of tax competition on the indicators of economic development of the country. 
The author defined the participation of local governments in the competition for attracting mobile capital as a 
prerequisite for low efficiency of the economy. Later, these hypotheses formed the basis of the first official models 
of tax competition. 
Thus, according to the Zodrov-Meshkovsky model, the source of funding for local government expenditures is 
the receipt of capital tax. This leads to lower tax rates and, as a result, insufficient funding for public goods and 
services. Despite a number of advantages, the model developed by the authors has some limitations: 
- the model does not take into account the existence of a significant number of identical jurisdictions (cities, 
regions, etc.); 
- the model assumes the existence of a fixed population in each jurisdiction that has the same tastes and more 
or less equal income; 
- the activities of local authorities were aimed only at meeting the needs of residents of these areas; 
- material goods produced in one jurisdiction are consumed only by residents of that jurisdiction. 
The authors of this model put into scientific circulation the phenomenon of "race to the bottom", which consists 
in the predominance of taxes on real resources (labor) over taxes on capital. Given the state-imposed maximum 
level of tax burden on real estate and the need to revise tax rates, the government is reducing public services to 
levels that are not optimal in other jurisdictions. 
The shortcomings of the previous model were eliminated in the model of "asymmetric tax competitiveness". Thus, 
unlike their predecessors, Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) took into account the presence of a significant 
number of regions that differ in size and population. Thus, the authors hypothesized the existence of asymmetric 
tax competition as a result of competition for tax bases of large and small regions. This model was based on the 
assumption that larger jurisdictions have a greater demand for capital than small jurisdictions. This will increase 
the level of tax burden and, consequently, reduce the return on capital after tax. Thus, the authors emphasized that 
the cost of capital in large jurisdictions is less dependent on changes in tax rates than in small ones. 
Differences in the levels of taxation of individual regions lead to the formation of tax havens in small regions, 
and, consequently, the movement of capital from large to small regions. If there is a significant difference between 
regions, small competitive jurisdictions receive tax competitive advantages. Thus, proponents of this theory point 
out that despite the many negative effects of the elimination of tax competition on the economy, some small 
jurisdictions still have the opportunity to benefit from tax competition, which is to obtain additional capital and 
improve public services. 
Tax competition affects a significant number of indicators of economic development. Thus, according to Wilson 
(1987), tax competition has an impact on production and consumption in the country. This assumption formed 
the basis of the model of trade between jurisdictions, which is a system of three variables: the number of 
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jurisdictions, capital-intensive goods and labor-intensive goods. Even if trade relations are established between 
the same jurisdictions, they will still choose different tax schemes, which will lead to different specializations. 
Thus, regions with a lower level of taxation will specialize in the production of capital-intensive goods, while 
regions with a higher level of taxation will produce more labor-intensive goods. Thus, residents of regions 
competing for the development of capital-intensive industries have relatively higher incomes, but receive 
significantly fewer public services. 
Tax competition has an equally significant impact on labor migration. One of the features of the traditional model 
of tax competition is the assumption of a fixed population living in each tax jurisdiction, and the lack of migration 
between regions. At the same time, globalization processes in the world have led to a significant increase in the 
level of migration and significantly complicated the possibility of applying the traditional model in most countries. 
This problem has become especially relevant for the European Union countries, for which the freedom of 
movement of the individual is one of the main components of the value system. This has led to a revision of the 
traditional system of tax competition and the inclusion of population mobility. 
The model developed by Bruckner (2000) was based on the assumption that the community could freely choose 
to invest money, start a business, and live. 
Thus, the government by changing tax rates on basic payments increases the investment attractiveness of its 
territory. As a rule, in the process of making a decision on migration, first of all, the population takes into account 
the quality of state services and income levels. 
One of the little-studied theories of tax competition is the theory of income distribution, according to which 
government spending is directed not only to ensure public goods, but also to finance social programs and activities. 
If previous theories provided only one source of spending holders, the theory developed by Sinn (1994) provided 
for the presence of a significant amount of financial transfers aimed at the benefit of certain social categories of 
the population. Later, in the process of empirical calculations, the authors proved the validity of this hypothesis 
for the member states of the European Union. Proponents of this theory emphasized the need for state intervention 
in the process of redistribution of state revenues in favor of socially vulnerable groups and ensuring social justice 
in the country. 
The presence of tax competition only deepens the already existing disparities in the social development of the 
population and exacerbates economic problems. Thus, manipulation in the framework of tax competition with tax 
rates leads to a decrease in budget revenues due to the inability to finance social programs and activities. 
Representatives of another scientific school consider tax competition as a tool for economic growth of the country. 
Thus, according to the theory of fiscal federalism, the leading countries have significantly higher amounts of tax 
revenues due to additional revenues from tax payments from residents of other communities. This phenomenon 
in the economic literature is called "export of taxes". This theory has become the most studied under the influence 
of financial globalization, which is accompanied by an increase in the share of assets owned by non-residents. 
Thus, the state receives additional sources of funding for public services and improve the quality of their provision. 
Conclusions 
The results of the analysis show a significant impact of tax competition on the indicators of economic and social 
development of the country. Currently, there is no unified understanding of the role of tax competition, its 
advantages and disadvantages in the economic literature. On the one hand, tax competition reduces the level of 
tax burden in the country, increases the mobility of financial and labor resources, investment attractiveness of the 
country, improving the quality of public services. At the same time, the result of competition between individual 
jurisdictions on the basis of taxation is the maximum concentration of means and resources of production in one 
area and the reduction of production capacity in another. Based on the analysis of models of tax competition, we 
can conclude that they do not correspond to modern realities of economic development and, consequently, the 
inability to fully describe the relationship between countries - tax competitors. 
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